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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
copyright holders." FCC regulation of CATV, if it is designed to
adequately protect copyright holders' interests, is preferable to exten-
sion of the Buck and Statler decisions to an entirely new area where
the issues are distinct from these cases.
EXTENSION OF THE SULLIVAN RULE
TO NON-OFFICIAL PUBLIC FIGURES
On two separate occasions, Dr. Linus Pauling sued news services for
libel. In one case, involving a magazine which had identified Dr.
Pauling as a communist without proof of the accusation, his libel action
was dismissed by a New York court. In the second case, an editorial
in defendant's newspaper falsely reported that Dr. Pauling had been
cited for contempt of Congress. He had failed to comply with a con-
gressional demand for a list of associates who had aided him in cir-
culating a petition against nuclear testing, but was never actually cited
for contempt. A federal district court's verdict for defendant was
affirmed on the merits by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. In
both cases, held: If a person engages in public debate on controversial
and grave issues or attempts to guide public policy, any criticism of
such activity, free from actual malice,1 is privileged. Pauling v. Na-
tional Review, Inc., 49 Misc. 2d 975, 269 N.Y.S.2d 11 (Sup. Ct.
1966); Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188 (8th
Cir. 1966), petition for cert. filed, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3082 (U.S. Sept.
6, 1966) (No. 522).
Adopting the minority rule,2 the Supreme Court in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan applied the first and fourteenth amendments to state
"For a discussion of FCC regulations already imposed upon CATV see Zylstra,
Regulation of Community Antenna Television: Assertion of Jurisdiction by the
FCC, 3 LAW NoTEs No. 1 (Oct. 1966).
'The courts in the principal cases adopted the definition of "actual malice" found
in New York Times Co, v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964): a statement made
"with knowledge that it was false or with a reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not."
2 Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908), represented the minority
rule prior to Sullivan. By adopting Coleman, the holding in Sullivan was not only
a change in the substantive law of defamation, but was the initial application of the
constitutional protections of freedom of speech and press to state defamation laws.
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 256; Noel, Defamation of
Public Offcers and Candidates, 49 COLu-m. L. Rav. 875, 901-03 (1949); Pedrick,
Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern Translation, 49 CORMELL
L.Q. 581, 587 (1964) ; Note, Recent Developments Concerning Constitutional Limita-
tions on, State Defamation Laws, 18 VAND. L. REv. 1429, 1435-41 (1965).
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defamation laws and established actual malice as a requirement for
recovery by a libeled "public official," even in cases of libel per se.3
However, in frequently-quoted footnote 23,1 the Court refused to
determine how far down the ranks of "public officials" this rule would
apply or to specify categories of persons who would or would not be
included. Subsequent to Sullivan, footnote 23 has been expressly inter-
preted as both limiting5 and enlarging6 the scope of the "public official"
rule.
The courts in both principal cases recognized that uninhibited de-
bate on public issues is necessary for the preservation of our demo-
cratic system. They then observed that Dr. Pauling had become a
"public figure" by thrusting himself into the "vortex of the discussion
of a question of pressing public concern. 1r The courts found no dis-
tinction, regarding importance to public interest, between criticism of
a private citizen who seeks to influence national policy and criticism of
a public official. Concluding that application of Sullivan was being ex-
panded rather than restricted, both courts applied the Sullivan "public
official" rule to "public figures."' In National Review, the New York
court recognized the danger that an extension of the Sullivan doctrine
would inhibit private individuals from participating in public debate,
for libel law affords little protection from resulting criticism if proof of
'False publication to a third party that a person is a communist or has committed
a serious crime constitutes libel per se. See National Review Inc., 269 N.Y.S2d at
20; Globe Democrat, 362 F.2d at 198 n.2 (instructions to the jury). For a general
discussion of libelous per se publications, see PRossER, ToRTs 782 (3d ed. 1964).
'New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964):
We have no occasion here to determine how far down into the lower ranks of
government employees the "public official" designation would extend for the
purposes of this rule, or otherwise to specify categories of persons who would
or would not be included. Cf. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 573-575. Nor need
we here determine the boundaries of the "official conduct" concept. It is enough
for the present case that respondent's position as an elected city commissioner
clearly made him a public official ....
'The court in Clark v. Pearson, 248 F. Supp. 188, 194 (D.D.C. 1965), interpreted
footnote 23 as demonstrating that the Sullivan Court intended to limit its ruling to
public officials.
'The court in Walker v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 246 F. Supp.
231 (W.D. Ky. 1965), applied Sullivan to an ex-army general who participated in a
racial disturbance at the University of Mississippi. The court emphasized that,
through footnote 23, Sullivan failed to limit its holding. See Comment, 30 ALBANY
L. REv. 316, 323-24 (1966).7269 N.Y.S.2d at 15; 362 F.2d at 197.
'The Eighth Circuit held that "once the principal of New York Times is accepted
-and our only choice is to accept it-logic commands that it be applied to a person
such as Dr. Pauling .... " 362 F2d at 197. After discussing the applications of
Sullivan, the New York court concluded, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 16:
These considerations, stated by the Court with reference to public officials,
would seem to be equally applicable to a private person who publicly, promi-
nently, actively, and as a leader, thrusts himself (however properly) into a dis-
cussion of public and exceedingly controversial questions.
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actual malice is required. The extension was justified, however, by
concluding that these same individuals would be protected as defend-
ants in libel suits.'
The most obvious problem raised by Sullivan and magnified by the
principal cases is determining who falls within the classes of "public
official" and "public figure." The Supreme Court's failure or inability,
subsequent to Sullivan, to define clearly "public official"'1 has already
resulted in misapplication of the Sullivan rule." Even more perplex-
ing will be the problem of identifying who is a "public figure" and
determining whether criticism of his activity is to be privileged.'- A
"public official" may at least be identified as an officeholder or one
who is in a position of responsibility to the public. A "public figure,"
on the other hand, could be anyone from the chairman of the Repub-
lican Party to a proponent of repealing local Sunday "blue" laws.
Neither of the courts in the principal cases found it necessary to clearly
define public figure.' 3
' 269 N.Y.S.2d at 15-16. Public figures will be protected by Sullivan in criticisms
made about public officials, and, if the rule in the principal cases is accepted, in
criticisms made about other public figures. But there is nothing to protect them in
making misstatements of fact about persons not falling within these two classes.
Therefore, the justification given in the principal case does not seem to be com-
pletely accurate. See note 25 infra.
"' In Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966), the Court, vaguely defining "public
official," held:
[T]he "public official" designation applies at the very least to those among the
hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have,
substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs.
The application of Sullivan to a county recreational area supervisor does not leave
many in governmental employment who are not "public officials." The only restric-
tion seems to be that the official must have control over the situation criticized. See
Note, 34 FORDHAm L. REv. 761, 765 (1966).
"An example of such misapplication was the requirement that a lawyer prove
actual malice in order to recover in a libel action though he never entered into public
debate but was merely the partner of a candidate for mayor. The "mayor's law firm"
was accused of practising under conditions showing conflicting interests, but the
innocent partner was denied recovery. The court held that since the mayor was pre-
cluded from recovery by the Sullivan rule, his law partner was also precluded in an
action on the same subject matter. The court reasoned that the law firm had gen-
erated the public issue on which the comment was made, and as a member, "plaintiff
made himself as much a part of the political campaign as did his law partner, the
Mayor." Gilberg v. Goffi, 21 App. Div. 2d 517, 207 N.E.2d 620, 251 N.Y.S.2d 823,
831 (1964). See also Note, 51 VA. L. Rsv. 106, 115 (1965).
'It is recognized that notoriety alone does not qualify a person as a "public
figure" to whom the Sullivan rule will apply. See Dempsey v. Time, Inc., 43 Misc.
2d 754, 252 N.Y.S.2d 186, 189 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 22 App. Div. 2d 854, 254 N.Y.S.2d 80
(1964) (prizefighter); Frank v. Aware, Inc., 14 N.Y.2d 954, 202 N.E.2d 372, 253
N.Y.S.2d 990 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 916 (1965) (radio and television per-
former).
I See text accompanying note 7 supra. It may be argued that the principal cases
limited the class of "public figures" to those of national importance. But Roseniblatt
extended Sullivan to a county recreational area supervisor, and there is a strong
analogical argument that because the principal cases relied on Sullivan, they could
and will be applied to insignificant "public figures."
[ VOL-. 42: 621
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Another problem faced by courts applying the Sullivan rule is
determining what constitutes actual malice. The Supreme Court de-
fined actual malice as making a statement "with knowledge that it was
false or with a reckless disregard of whether it was false or not,"'"
but failed to disclose the meaning of "reckless disregard." This lack
of definition renders virtually insurmountable a plaintiff's already
difficult burden of proof."5 In National Review, the court held that
even if defendants had relied on unreliable sources of information,
there was no showing of reckless disregard. 16 In Globe-Democrat the
court stated that the newspaper's conduct could possibly be construed
as constituting reportorial negligence or as being antagonistic toward
plaintiff, but fell short of constituting actual malice. Because of the
difficulty of proving reckless disregard, a person within the class of
public figure, as well as public official, will probably be unable to re-
cover in a libel action without proving the defendant knew that his
statement was false.' 8
In a well written opinion, the court in Globe-Democrat reasoned that
logic commanded an extension of the Sullivan rule to public figures.'9
The court failed, however, to recognize or give sufficient weight to
countervailing arguments which do not support the extension of Sul-
livan. In the first place, the possible consequences of the holdings in
the principal cases may be contrary to the major justification for
establishing the Sullivan rule, which was the encouragement and pro-
tection of uninhibited debate on public issues.20 Because those qualify-
", New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
"n The difficult burden of proving "reckless disregard" has been compared to the
burden of proving "gross negligence" in automobile guest statutes. Pedrick, supra
note 2, at 597; Note, 18 VAND. L. REv. 1429, 1452-53 (1965).
To avoid this difficult burden of proof, it has been suggested that a libeled public
official or public figure be given a right of reply as an alternative to a cause of
action, but the time lapse and great expense usually destroys the effectiveness of such
a right. Pedrick, supra note 2, at 604-06. Also, the public figure may feel reluctant
to reply for fear of reiterating the libel.
10269 N.Y.S2d at 19.
1362 F.2d at 198. See Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 35 U.S.L. WFEK 2098
(D.C. Cir. July 28, 1966) (failure of verification by newspaper did not constitute
actual malice). In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 287-88 (1964),
the Court held that failing to check its own files, which would have shown the
falsity of the statement, might have been negligence on the part of the newspaper but
did not constitute "reckless disregard."
" Note, 18 VAND. L. Rr~v. 1429, 1452 n.158 (1965). See also Hallen, Character of
Belief Necessary for the Conditiolial Privilege in Defamation, 25 ILL. L. REV. 865,
866 (1931) (a pre-Sullivan article describing actual malice as synonymous with
lack of good faith).
,, 362 F.2d at 197. See Walker v. Associated Press, 417 P2d 486, 489-90 (Colo.
1966).1 In this country there has been "a profound national commitment to the principal
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that it
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ing as public figures must bear the same difficult burden of proof as
public officials, an individual risks sacrificing the protection of his
reputation provided by traditional libel laws whenever he promotes a
cause in which he believes.2 Consequently, because of an individual's
fear of sustaining irreparable damage to his reputation, unqualified
extension of Sullivan to public figures quite likely will hinder rather
than enhance public debate. 2  Thus, in the balance of competing in-
terests, the promotion of public debate does not necessarily favor ex-
tension of Sullivan in the principal cases. 3
Another major consideration in the Sullivan decision, which the
court in Globe-Democrat considered insignificant, was the protection
granted a public official, in the absence of actual malice, for statements
made in his official capacity. The Court in Sullivan held that a similar
privilege should be extended to the citizen-critic of government, for "It
would give the public servants an unjustified preference over the public
they serve, if critics of official conduct did not have a fair equivalent
of the immunity granted to the officials themselves." 4 A public figure
may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
270 (1964); Pauling v. National Review Inc., 49 Misc. 2d 975, 269 N.Y.S2d 11, 15
(Sup. Ct. 1966); Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188, 192 (8th
Cir. 1966), petition for cert. filed, 35 U.S.L. W= 3082 (U.S. Sept. 6, 1966) (No.
52 in National Review it was held that Dr. Pauling had sacrificed his legal
remedies when his reputation was libeled for the things he believed in. 269 N.Y.S.2d
at 20-21. See note 9 supra.
"Note, 51 VA. L. REv. 106, 119-20 (1965) ; 44 N.C.L. REv. 442, 448 (1966). Mr.justice Goldberg, concurring in Sullivan, advocated an absolute privilege on the part
of the public to criticize public officials, and stated, "If individual citizens may be
held liable in damages for strong words, which a jury finds false and maliciously
motivated, there can be little doubt that public debate and advocacy will be don-
strained." 376 U.S. at 300. It follows by analogy that if by criticizing government
officials, the individual citizen subjects himself to the same lack of protection
possessed by a public official, public debate will similarly be constrained. Cf. 38
U. COLO. L. REv. 424, 426 (1966) (no constitutional protection for such a privilege).
nThe court in Harper v. National Review, Inc., 33 U.S.L. WEEK 2341 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Dec. 22, 1964), affd without opinion, 263 N.Y.S.2d 292 (App. Div. 1965),
held, "Uninhibited, robust and wide open debate (376 U.S. 270) of public officials does
not privilege defamation of private persons by falsehood under the present state of the
law." See Clark v. Pearson, 248 F. Supp. 188, 195 (D.D.C. 1965); SEELmAN, THE
LAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK f 240 (Supp. 1963); Note,
The Scope of First Amendment Protection for Good-faith Defamatory Error, 75 YALE
L.J. 642, 650 (1966). Contra, Walker v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 246
F. Supp. 231, 234-35 (W.D. Ky. 1965).
"New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282-83 (1964). The court in
Globe-Democrat stated that the "undesirable preference" argument was employed in
Sullivan only as a final or clinching factor. 362 F.2d at 196. However, not only did
the majority in Sullivan carefully consider this argument, but the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas, included similar
discussion. 376 U.S. at 304. Some commentators have recognized that the "un-
desirable preference" doctrine was not merely a clinching factor. See, e.g., Evans,
The New Freedom of Speech in Politics, 10 N.Y.L.F. 333, 341 (1964).
[ VOL. 42 : 621
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such as Dr. Pauling, however, enjoys no similar privilege in statements
made within the scope of his public activity. 5 Consequently, there is
no analogical basis for a privilege to criticize his activity."
A public official, whether elected or appointed, 7 is scrutinized not
only because he influences public policy but because he is a servant of
the people and responsible to them for his actions. 28 A local county
treasurer may not significantly influence policy, but he controls a phase
of government in which the public is keenly interested, and justifiably
so. On the other hand, a leader of an interest group may have in-
fluence, but his wages are not paid by taxes nor is he directly respon-
sible to the public. He should not be subject to the same ruthless
attacks as his counterpart in public office. 9 It has been said that a
public official assumes the risk that he will be unprotected from sharp
attacks and accusations, especially if he campaigns for his position. 0
There is a strong public notion that a political candidate or officeholder
must be able to "take it."" A private individual who seeks to influence
public policy expects his methods or motives to be questioned, possibly
ridiculed, and this discussion may have significant utility; but public
policy does not require that he sacrifice the protection of his reputation
for that in which he believes.2
" Dr. Pauling may have a conditional privilege when criticizing government
policy or officials, see note 9 supra, but a public official's privilege extends to any
utterance made within the outer perimeter of his duties. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S.
564, 575 (1958); Gold Seal Chinchillas, Inc. v. State, 69 Wash. Dec. 2d 834, 840, 420
P.2d 698 (1966); 38 So. CAL. L. REv. 349, 354 (1965) ; 31 TEmx. L. REv. 504, 506
(1964).
The author in 18 VAND. L. REv. 1429, 1455 (1965), indicated that it would be
irrational to extend to a citizen-critic or public figure the privilege granted to a
public official in Barr v. Matteo, supra.
'Clark v. Pearson, 248 F. Supp. 188, 195-96 (D.D.C. 1965); Fignole v. Curtis
Publishing Co., 247 F. Supp. 595, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (candidate for public office in
Haiti); 44 N.C.L. REv. 442, 448 (1966).
-' Pape v. Time, Inc., 354 F.2d 558, 559 (7th Cir. 1965) (Sullivan not limited to
elected public officials).
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966) (public had a right to know of suspicion
of mismanagement of public funds).
' See generally Note, 51 VA. L. REv. 106, 112-15 (1965); Thornton & McNiece
Torts, in 1965 ANNuAL Suevey oF A2=cAw LAw 411, 422-23 (1966).
' "Charges of gross incompetence, disregard of the public interest, communist
sympathies, and the like usually have filled the air; and hints of bribery, embezzle-
ment, and other criminal conduct are not infrequent." Noel, supra note 2, at 875,
quoted in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 n.14 (1964).
' Noel, supra note 2, at 876. It has been held that Sullivan is not rendered in-
applicable merely because a public official's private as well as public reputation is
injured. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964); Thompson v. St. Amant,
184 So. 2d 314, 322 (La. 1966).
' But see Time, Inc. v. Hill, 87 Sup. Ct 534, 542 (1967) (right of privacy
action) : "Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in
a civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life in
a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press."
1967]
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In establishing actual malice as the requirement for recovery by
libeled public officials, the Court in Sullivan used a balancing test, as
did the courts in the principal cases. The Sullivan Court unhesitatingly
favored criticism of official conduct over the possibility of injuring
reputations of public officials, reasoning that (1) the benefit derived
from discussing candidates and public officials greatly outweighed the
chance of injuring individual character, 33 (2) the "undesirable prefer-
ence" doctrine demanded it,34 and (3) public officials, as they are
responsible to the public, should be scrutinized. 5 In the principal
cases, the value of uninhibited debate of public issues had to be
balanced against the protection of reputations of non-government pub-
lic figures, as well as the preservation of the common law of defama-
tion. As developed above, public debate may be hindered rather than
enhanced, the "undesirable preference" doctrine does not apply, and
public figures, although open to criticism, should not be subjected to
the same scrutinization as officeholders. It is therefore submitted that
the balance of interests does not favor an unqualified extension of
Sullivan to public figures.
It is submitted that extending the Sullivan rule to public figures is
unnecessary, for the generally accepted right of fair comment on mat-
ters of public concern36 provides sufficient freedom to discuss activities
of public figures. This rule allows a conditional privilege to state
opinions as long as they may be reasonably inferred from provable
facts. 7 For example, such a privilege would permit a news service to
warn the public of any danger its editors believed could result from
the activities of a public figure. The alleged activities, however, must
' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 281 (1964); Noel, supra note
2, at 895, expressing the opinion that such privileged discussion would not deter
competent men from seeking office.
" New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 33, at 282-83. See notes 24 & 25
supra.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964).
^'See RESTATFMENT, ToRTs §606(1), comments b, c, & d (1938). This right of
fair comment extends to critical opinions as long as they are offered in good faith
(free from malice), but does not allow misstatements of fact. Noel, supra note 2, at
877-88. Of course the right of fair comment no longer applies to criticism of public
officials, for misstatements of fact are protected under the Sullivan rule. New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964); 18 VAND. L. REV. 1429, 1449-50
(1965). See Associated Press v. Walker, 393 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965),
cert. granted, 87 Sup. Ct. 40 (1966), which was decided under the fair comment
rule without mention of Sullivan. One of the questions presented on appeal is
whether Sullivan is limited to public officials or is applicable to other persons. 35
U.S.L. W= 3019 (U.S. July 5, 1966) (No. 150).
Derounian v. Stokes, 168 F2d 305, 307-08 (10th Cir. 1948). See note 36 supra.
Contra, Pearson v. Fairbanks Publishing Co., 413 P2d 711, 713-14 (Alaska 1966)
(privilege of public discussion was not limited to opinion because of tenuous dis-
tinction between fact and opinion).
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be susceptible of proof and constitute a reasonable basis for the warn-
ing.
In the recent right of privacy case, Time, Inc. v. Hill, the Court
indicated that the constitutional protections of freedom of speech and
press were not limited to criticism of public officials. 38 Although the
principles in Sullivan were applied, the Court expressly refused to
determine whether the decision would be applicable to libel actions
where plaintiff was not a public official.
39
If the Supreme Court decides to affirm the extension of Sullivan
in Globe-Democrat,40 it should establish definitions as well as standards
of proof which will enable trial courts to decide such cases and let
individuals know when they become subject to privileged discussion.
A possible solution to the problem of defining "public figure" is for the
Court to divide that class into various definite categories and decide in
which categories the utility of public debate outweighs the possibility
of injury to private reputation. Some suggested categories of public
figures are: (1) political figures on a national level, such as chairmen
of the major political parties or relatives of officeholders who them-
selves exert much influence; (2) individuals who may be known to
control, in a very real sense, certain officeholders; (3) lobbyists and
pressure group leaders; (4) individuals who either by affirmative
action or open debate attempt to influence national policy, but not
necessarily legislation (e.g., participants in freedom marches, television
appearances, petition circulations, or rallies intended to influence civil
rights or foreign policy); (5) persons in state politics, both lobbyists
and those who merely generate public interest through editorials or
public debate concerning issues of pressing local concern, such as
repealing local "blue" laws; and (6) individuals who are very active
in city affairs (e.g., advocates of expenditures for smog control, con-
struction of a sports stadium, or attraction of a world's fair to that
87 Sup. Ct. 534, 541-44 (1967).
r The Court said in part, id. at 541 n.9:
Our decision today is not to be taken to decide any constitutional questions
which may be raised in "libel per quod" actions involving publication of
matters of public interest, or in libel actions where the plaintiff is not a public
official.
See also id. at 544:
And the additional state interest in the protection of the individual against
damage to his reputation would be involved.... Moreover, a different test might
be required in a statutory action by a public official, as opposed to a libel
action by a public official or a statutory action by a private individual.
"Petition for certiorari was filed in Globe-Democrat, 35 U.S.L. WEE-K 3082 (U.S.
Sept. 6, 1966) (No. 522). See also Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d
649, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (indicating that Sullivan is likely to be extended).
19671
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particular city). While these categories are not exhaustive, they illus-
trate the necessity for and possible means of judicial determination of
definite boundaries of the class of public figures.
Furthermore, if a privilege to make misstatements of fact about
public figures is ultimately allowed, proof that the false statements
were made knowingly or negligently, rather than with reckless dis-
regard, should be required for recovery by libeled public figures.4
The suggestion for a less demanding burden of proof for public figures
is based on the premise that, balanced against the possible injury to
individual reputation, uninhibited discussion of public figures is not as
necessary as such discussion of public officials. Some limitation on the
application of Sullivan is needed; uninhibited public debate is a valu-
able instrument in the preservation of freedom and our democratic
system, but not to the extent that it destroys the law of defamation and
in turn the protection of individual reputation.
IMPUTED CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
A master, riding as passenger in a vehicle operated by his servant
within the scope of employment, sustained personal injuries and prop-
erty damage when the vehicle collided with one negligently operated
by an employee of defendant corporation. In the master's suit to
recover from defendant corporation, his servant was found contribu-
torily negligent. The trial court ruled that this contributory negligence
was imputed to the master, as a matter of law, to bar recovery on his
negligence claim. On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed.
Held: The rule that contributory negligence of a servant acting within
the scope of his employment is imputed to a master so as to bar the
master's right of recovery against a negligent third party is abandoned
in automobile negligence cases. Weber v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc.,
144 N.W.2d 540 (Minn. 1966).
Fault is the sine qua non of tort liability for negligence. 1 For
reasons of social policy-principally, allocation of risk to the party
better able to bear it-this fault standard has been departed from to
hold a principal vicariously liable for negligence of his agent acting
"But ef. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 87 Sup. Ct. 534, 543 (1967) (standard of negligence
too elusive in right of privacy action).
ISee PROSSER, TORTS § 74, at 506-07 (3d ed. 1964).
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